The literature on the economics of international environmental agreements has been developing for two decades. Some significant progress has been made. But some simple and fundamental questions remain unanswered, such as the Schelling Paradox of why intertemporal environmental agreements that benefit the developing world should be easier to achieve than agreements on development assistance involving no intertemporal dimensions. This paper provides a general review of what the literature on the economics of international environmental agreements has taught us and what the implications are of that literature for the actual world of environmental agreements. The paper identifies four possible anomalies between the theory of international agreements and empirical evidence. One is why do individual countries appear to be willing to act unilaterally, when that is not individually rational in the standard sense? Another is why is country income ignored in theory whereas it is a dominant issue in the "real world." A third is why theory predicts more free-riding that one finds in experimental work or even casual empiricism of actual experience with treaties. A fourth and related technical question is why increases in the benefit cost ratio for abatement tends to decrease agreement size in theory but has the opposite effect in experiments. The paper suggests that social preferences may offer a way of bringing theory and empirics closer together for the case of international environmental agreements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) began in earnest in the early 1990's with the pioneering work of Hoel (1992) , Barrett (1994) , and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) . Yet the real pioneer is Tom Schelling, who in his 1973 paper on multiagent prisoner's dilemmas (Schelling, 1973) detailed the problem of a group of agents coordinating action for the common good. Though couched in a broader problem context, it is clearly the core of the problem of IEAs. To quote from his introduction to that paper, "The literature of externalities has mostly to do with how much of a good or a bad should be produced, consumed, or allowed. Here I consider only the interdependence of choices to do or not to do, to join or not to join, to stay or to leave, to vote yes or no, to conform or not to conform to some agreement or rule or restriction. Joining a disciplined, self-restraining coalition, or staying out and doing what's natural is a binary choice." (Schelling, 1973, p382) That is the essence of the literature on IEAs: what are the characteristics of coalitions of countries, formed to deal with a global or regional environmental threat, such as climate change? Or from a normative perspective, what design characteristics for IEAs will yield higher levels of aggregate welfare/environmental protection? The connection between the multiagent prisoner's dilemma and IEAs has long been recognized, though the connection to Schelling's early work is often overlooked 1 .
1 Barrett (2003) does acknowledge the connection to Schelling (1978) which summarizes Schelling (1973) .
One of the issues in actually doing something about climate change, which indirectly is related to the question of IEAs, was also highlighted by Tom Schelling in a 1995 paper: "It would be strange to forgo a per cent or two of GNP for 50 years for the benefit of Indians, Chinese, Indonesians and others who will be living 50 or 100 years from nowand probably much better off than today's Indians, Chinese, and Indonesians -and not a tenth of that amount to increase the consumption of contemporary Indians, Chinese, and Indonesians. At its peak, the Marshall plan took about 1.5% of US GNP … and it was recognized as a short-run emergency. Americans do nothing like that now for anybody alive, except other living Americans." (Schelling, 1995, p397) Similar statistics could be generating for other developed countries. The irony is that the developed world appears to be willing to invest in greenhouse mitigation, a principal beneficiary of which is the developing world of a century from now. Yet those same countries appear unwilling to invest much to help today's developing world. This is all the more ironic considering that the future developing world will (hopefully) be considerably richer than today's developing world.
Focusing just on the literature on IEAs, there are a number of anomalies or disconnects between what theory tells us and what we see in the world. Theory helps us understand many dimensions of international agreements to address environmental problems but a number of puzzles remain -aspects of the world that are either at odds with theory or on which theory is silent or unhelpful.
One such issue is the apparent willingness of a number of countries and political jurisdictions to unilaterally reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of an effective multilateral agreement. In fact, it is remarkable how common this is in the world. The EU is the primary member of the Kyoto Protocol (though there are other countries) and is almost unilaterally taking steps to reduce carbon emissions. The debate over greenhouse gas controls in the US Congress is not in the context of an international agreement but in terms of the US doing its part. States of the US have unilaterally adopted greenhouse gas regulations, the most well-known instance of which is California's legislation mandating a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050. In California's case, it is highly unlikely that California's actions will have any direct effect on the amount of climate change the state suffers. Yet there is significant public support for taking action and even incurring some costs. This is inconsistent with IEA theory and even standard notions of individual rationality.
One observation of the international agreement process is that income seems to make a difference in a country's willingness-to-accede to a climate agreement. Rich countries alone are the ones discussing carrying the burden of reducing emissions. Although this may not seem too surprising to most, the fact is that IEA theory is silent on the role of income in forging roles for countries in an agreement.
Another apparent anomaly comes from the experimental literature. A large body of experimental literature finds that free-riding on the efforts of others is far less prevalent than simple theory suggests. The public goods literature has made some progress in bringing theory and experiments closer together (introducing issues of fairness or "warm glow"). Yet the IEA literature has not been able to bring theory more in line with experiments.
A theme of this review is the disconnect between theoretical results and empirical/experimental results. The purpose of this paper is to highlight these apparent anomalies in the IEA literature and suggest possible future work to address the issues.
In the following three sections of this paper, we survey several strands of literature related to this question of forming coalitions to address transboundary environmental problems. We first consider the voluntary contributions to public goods literature and how theory and experiments diverge. We then turn to the theory of international environmental agreements -coalitions to provide public goods.
In Section IV we consider experimental evidence on coalitions to provide public goods (scant though it is). We then return to the anomalies mentioned above and ask how well the literature addresses them.
A major conclusion of the paper is that the theory of international environmental agreements is somewhat lacking in explanatory power. The paper recommends taking a cue from the voluntary provision of public goods literature and incorporating social preferences into the theory of international environmental agreements.
II VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Pro-environment actions by individual countries to address global environmental problems are classic examples of noncooperative actions to provide a public good. Bergstrom et al (1986) provide a classic treatment of this problem, developing a simple model involving individual provision of a private good, x i , the public good, g i , and aggregate provision of the public good, G (=Σg i ). Each identical agent has simple preferences and an endowment of wealth, w i , to be divided between x i and g i . The
individual's utility maximization problem is
where the first argument of u embodies the opportunity cost to the individual of providing the public good and the second term reflects the benefit of the aggregate provision. The authors show that in most cases there is a nonzero equilibrium provision of the public good. A second interesting result involves identical preferences but different wealth levels. In this case, there is a cutoff level of wealth.
People who are poorer than the cutoff provide none of the public good whereas people above the cutoff provide a nonzero amount. Andreoni (1988) uses this model to determine how contributions increase as the size of the economy (n-the number of individuals) increases. He shows that as n increases towards infinity, average individual contributions approach zero, the size of the contributing group approaches zero and the aggregate contributions approach a limit which is finite and nonzero. He points out that this is at variance with casual empiricism that individuals do contribute to public goods, despite the economy being very large. For instance, according to Andreoni, half of all US households claim charitable donations on their tax returns (in the US, charitable donations are subsidized in that they are deductible from taxable income).
Early experimental work on public good provision established that subjects tend to provide public goods at higher rates than predicted by the theory described above. Kim and Walker (1984) set up a laboratory experiment to test the "free rider hypothesis," which had been the subject of a number of papers in the 1970s (in the context of the prisoner's dilemma). This hypothesis simply is that individuals will prefer to free-ride rather than make contributions to the public good. The authors distinguish between the "strong" free riders and other free riders. Strong free riders are closer to the theoretical behavior of contributing little to the public good. The authors show that although free-riding exists, they are not able to conclude that the free-riding is as strong as theory suggests. Isaac and Walker (1988) provide additional experimental evidence, exploring the role of an important variable, the marginal per capita return (MPCR). The MPCR is defined as the ratio of the marginal benefit to an individual of privately providing a public good to the marginal cost of that provision by the individual.
Put differently, for every dollar a person spends on privately providing the public good, the MPCR measures how much the individual gets back. Clearly the MPCR is less than one (otherwise there is no issue). Higher MPCRs mean that the private gain from the public good is higher. A lower MPCR means that the individual is getting less private reward from providing the public good. Isaac and Walker (1988) demonstrate experimentally that MCPR is the primary determinant of contribution levels-there is no separate pure group size effect. 2 Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that the strong free rider effect is more pronounced for lower values of MPCR.
In an interesting review of this literature, Chaudhuri (2010) characterizes five main findings of the pre-1995 literature (attributing the last three to Ledyard, 1995) : (1) in one shot versions of the noncooperative public goods game (described above) there is much less free-riding (more contribution) than predicted by theory; (2) if players repeat the one-shot game, free-riding increases with repeated interaction; (3) communication facilitates cooperation; (4) thresholds facilitate cooperation; and (5) higher MPCRs lead to increased cooperation and decreased free-riding.
Over the past decade or two, researchers have been moving beyond simple characterizations of payoffs to include a variety of "social preferences" on the part of participants. One of the first extensions of this nature is the model of "impure altruism" by Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( ,1990 , building in part on suggestions decades earlier by Mancur Olson and Gary Becker on charitable giving. Impure altruism holds that there are two avenues for personal utility gain from making a voluntary contribution to a public good: via the aggregate level of the public good and via a "warm glow" associated with making a donation. Thus the individual may appear altruistic but that is because the individual obtains utility from giving. Thus the utility function in Eqn. (1a) becomes u(x i ,G,g i ). It is easy to see that including a private good dimension to public good contributions can remedy the apparent anomalies between the experimental results on free-riding and the theoretical results on contributions to public goods.
Other authors provide alternative models of contributing to public goods, always with the issue of free-riding as a motivator. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) posit that inequality aversion drives cooperation.
They propose the importance of inequality aversion as a dimension of utility that promotes cooperation and support the thesis with experimental evidence. Charness and Rabin (2002) present evidence in direct contradiction to this result, suggesting that efficiency also plays a role in outcomes in prisoner's dilemma games. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game shown in Fig. 1 , theory would suggest defection repeatedly occurs. However, in an experimental setting, Charness et al (2008) find cooperation rates of 15%, 45% and 70% for values of x of 4, 5, and 6, respectively. This suggests more nuanced objectives. A Defects (7,1) (2,2)
Note: With payoff (a,b), a is payoff to player A and b is payoff to player B; 2<x<7. Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) , in a paper with a superb title, examine the case where individuals have different "abilities" or costs to supply the public good. They show that even in a noncooperative, repeated setting, the lowest cost individuals will eventually take it upon themselves to supply the public good. In the context of IEAs, this is relevant because income heterogeneity is large among the countries of the world and rich countries appear to be more willing to undertake investing in greenhouse gas mitigation than others.
The formation of groups or coalitions of players to coordinate the provision of public goods is directly analogous to the IEA literature. Yet only recently has the public goods literature begun to address coalition formation (Charness and Yang, 2011) .
III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THEORY
The literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) starts with a framework nearly identical to Eqn (1) for voluntary provision of public goods. For instance, Barrett (1994) suggests the following general objective for country i:
where g i is abatement by country i. The interesting twist added by the IEA literature (drawn from the cartel stability literature 3 ) is that the noncooperative behavior is represented as a two stage game. In the first stage (the "membership game") countries decide whether they wish to be in a coalition (an IEA). Specifically, each country announces "in" or "out;" the first stage game is a Nash equilibrium in these announcements. In the second stage (the "emissions game"), the coalition acts as one and emissions choices of the coalition and fringe are a Nash equilibrium in emissions conditional on the coalition formed in the first stage. Unfortunately, he is unable to come up with analytic results without simplifying; in particular, he shows that when B in Eqn (2) is restricted to be linear, the largest coalition that can emerge consists of three countries (see also Finus, 2001) . For the general model of Eqn. (2), he uses simulations to suggest that welfare gains from an IEA (relative to the noncooperative outcome) are
modest. An IEA may have many members (relative to N), but in such cases , welfare gains are slight compared to the noncooperative equilibrium; conversely, when cooperation would increase net benefits significantly, the equilibrium size of an IEA is small. In other words, generally (but not always)
there is an inverse relationship between the equilibrium number of coalition members and the gains from cooperation (ie, the welfare difference between a full cooperative outcome and a noncooperative outcome). 4 This result is consistent with experience with actual environmental agreements. Both Barrett (1994 Barrett ( ,2003 and Murdoch and Sandler (1997) suggest that a major reason the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion had so many members (virtually all countries joined) was that the gains to cooperation over unilateral action were very small.
One simplification of the model (Barrett, 1999; Ulph, 2004 ) is for marginal benefits and marginal costs to be constant. In this case, it is easy to show that the equilibrium consists of fringe countries not abating (g i = 0) and coalition members abating providing the coalition is large enough. Let n* be the smallest size of a coalition which chooses to abate. Of course n* may be 0 or 1. Eqn. (2) is simplified so that marginal benefits and costs are constant:
where b < c (otherwise it is individually rational to abate). Note in the above that b/c is the MPCR of the problem, using the nomenclature of the public goods literature. In this case a coalition of size n abates
This implies that n* ≈ c/b = 1/MPCR ,
using the terminology of the voluntary provision of public goods literature. (More precisely, the coalition size is the smallest integer greater than or equal to c/b = 1/MPCR.) Since MPCR = b/c, this means n* = 1/MPCR. The intuition is that larger coalitions provide abatement but any member can do better by defecting to the fringe. However, at some point, a defection causes the coalition to revert to pollute; thus any defection at that critical size is in fact not individually rational. That coalition size is n*.
The gains from cooperation are easily specified. If each of N countries cooperate, the aggregate 
Note that benefits from cooperation increase in MPCR whereas the size of a coalition decreases in MPCR. This is the essence of Barrett's (1994) conjecture that when the gains to cooperation are greatest, the equilibrium coalition will be smallest, and vice-versa.
One of the problems with this simple static representation of IEA formation is that it is highly stylized and not particularly robust to changes in the formulation. As mentioned above, coalitions consist of at most three countries for the model represented by Eqn (2). A slight change results in Eqn (3) where any size of coalition is possible, depending on parameter values.
A number of authors focus on incentives to hold coalitions together, whether these be punishments or transfers among countries. A very different approach was taken by Barrett (2002 Barrett ( , 2003 in which he focuses on repeated interactions and credible punishments that can hold a coalition together. Allowing repeated interaction (a repeated game) opens up the possibilities for a variety of outcomes, primarily because punishment strategies for defectors can be built into an agreement and then applied should a country defect.
One simple punishment is called the "grim" strategy. Simply put, if anyone defects, the treaty will be cancelled and all countries will pollute. This is effectively the punishment of Chander and Tulkens (1997) . This punishment is subgame perfect in the sense that if all countries are punishing by polluting, it is rational for any individual country to also do that. But it is not necessarily collectively rational for the coalition to do this. If one country defects, the coalition may be better off after the defection by agreeing to continue to abate.
Following the treatment of renegotiation-proof solutions to the n-person prisoner's dilemma by Farrell and Maskin (1989) , Barrett (2002) distinguishes between strongly collectively rational (SCR) agreements with punishments and weakly collectively rational agreements with punishments (WCR).
Starting with a subgame perfect equilibrium, suppose a group of countries agrees to coordinate their pollution strategies and also agrees on the punishment that occurs if any member defects in a subsequent period. The agreement stipulates the consequences when some member defects. Should a defection occur, if the prior agreed punishment is collectively preferred to not punishing, then the agreement is WCR. However, there may be some other punishment/action after defection which may in fact be collectively preferred to following the punishment prescribed in the agreement. If not, then the agreement is SCR.
Of the set of WCR, consider those involving all countries. Barrett (2002) calls these consensus treaties. Trivially, such agreements exist -such as the one in which everyone agrees to always play the Nash noncooperative strategy (though the welfare gains are nil). Barrett (2002) shows that a WCR consensus treaty (involving all N countries) sustains a per-period payoff of b*(N-1)*MPCR. Though the per period payoff is typically less than in Eqn. (4), on the positive side, there is broader participation.
Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) qualify and extend this result. These results rely on a very low discount rate; it is unclear whether the results hold with more realistic discount rates. Thus it is difficult to generalize such results.
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
The previous section sketched some of the results that have emerged from the theoretical literature on international environmental agreements. In recent years, a number of authors have sought to empirically validate some of the conclusions emerging from the theoretical literature. Since using actual data on international treaties is a bit difficult, 5 nearly all of this work has involved laboratory experiments.
Kosfeld et al (2009) is one of the first published papers to examine the simple IEA model with constant marginal costs and marginal benefits (Eqn 3) experimentally. However, the focus of their paper is on the role of fairness and equity in forming coalitions, as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . One limiting aspect of the experiment is that only four players are involved. One result is that allowing a 5 There are few empirical papers using actual treaty data. One is Wagner (2010) , who examines the timing of signing the Montreal Protocol. Murdoch et al (2003) examine the likelihood that a European country will sign on to the Helskini Protocol on Curbing Sulfur Emissions. Finus and Tjøtta (2003) also examine the sulfur problem, specifically the successor to the Helsinki Protocol, and compute the welfare gains associated with the Oslo Protocol, concluding that the agreement accomplished little.
coalition to form does increase the total contribution to the public good. Another result, not emphasized by the authors, is that a higher MPCR tends to increase the size of a coalition (or at least the average size), contrary to theory. Their results are also suggestive that fairness is important in forming
IEAs -large IEAs with universal membership are preferred (although the fact that there are only four players limits the generality of this result).
Burger and Kolstad (2009) Eqn 2, except with d=0 (ie, constant marginal benefits). Their experiment involves ten subjects, as Burger and Kolstad (2009) . The process of forming a coalition and then making a joint decision on contributions from the coalition is similar, though not the same, as Burger and Kolstad (2009) . There are also some differences in the experimental design. No subjects were involved in more than one treatment. Furthermore, it appears that each treatment was repeated ten times with different students. On the other hand, the form of the payoff function limits the theoretical coalition size to 3, as described in section II above. And the paper does not vary the MPCR. One interesting result is that allowing a coalition to form does not seem to increase the aggregate contribution to the public good, contrary to the results in the two other experimental papers reviewed here.
V ADDRESSING EMPIRICAL ANOMALIES
In the introduction, we highlighted a number of "disconnects" between the economic theory of IEAs and the "real world." We return to those anomalies here:
A1: Why do individual countries appear to be willing to "go it alone" in the absence of an IEA (when it is not individually rational, in the standard sense)?
A2:
Why is income not relevant in IEA theory whereas it is a dominant issue in the "real world"?
A3:
Why do experiments on free-riding and casual empiricism of the real world suggest far more cooperation than in IEA theory?
A4: Why do some theoretical results suggest that an increase in MPCR decreases the size of a coalition while experiments suggest the opposite? [this is a corollary to A3]
Anomaly #1 reflects the observations that (1) the EU is willing to undertake significant mitigation efforts almost unilaterally; (2) states in the US such as California are also willing to undertake unilateral mitigation; (3) the US legislative debate on greenhouse gas regulation (which has not yet been successful) does not appear to be in the context of an international agreement. There are many other examples which share the common theme that unilateral actions are being undertaken, despite the fact that the acting entity will in all likelihood see very little, if any, moderation in climate change as a result of the action.
Anomaly #2 reflects the fact that it is the EU, US, Japan and assorted other rich countries that have been taking the lead, and willingly, in bearing the costs of solving the climate problem. Although some countries (notably the US) have demanded participation by the developing world, the expectation is only that the developing world agree to cooperate rather than pay. IEA theory does not recognize this wealth effect.
Anomaly #3 is a reflection of the strong free-riding that occurs in most IEA models (at least static IEA models). When cooperation is fruitful, theory suggests there will be little cooperation. This is the same free-riding that appears in non-cooperative models of public good provision. Yet such free-riding is inconsistent with experiments on cooperation. Casual empiricism of actual treaties is somewhat less anomalous and more consistent with IEA theory -though the evidence is very sparse. This is not to say that the IEA theories do not have some explanatory power - Barrett (2003) convincingly weaves experience with real environmental treaties with theoretical predictions. However, just as in the case of voluntary contributions to public goods, theory tends to over-predict free-riding and under-predict cooperation.
Anomaly #4, closely related to Anomaly #3, addresses one of the main results in the simple static model of an IEA: as the MPCR increases, gains from cooperation increase, but the equilibrium size of an IEA shrinks. This is not an unequivocal result of theory since some theoretical structures predict the maximum number of members of an IEA is 3, which is not consistent with this anomaly. However, even in the case of a repeated game, the maximum number of countries which can sustain full cooperation by means of collectively rational punishments shrink as MPCR increases (Barrett, 2002) . At best we can say that for some common theoretical models of an IEA, there is an inverse relationship between MPCR and the size of a coalition. But the experimental literature suggests the opposite. As MPCR increases, cooperation increases. Although the experimental literature on IEAs is sparse, this result is entirely consistent with the experimental literature on private provision of public goods.
Although we will not offer a fully developed alternative model of IEA formation here, the voluntary contributions to public goods literature suggests a direction to take. In particular, assume that a country gets utility/welfare from its economic output, the overall level of carbon abatement, and a "warm glow" from its individual contributions to carbon abatement:
Welfare for country i = u i (w i , G, g i ) ,
using the nomenclature of Eqn. (1-2) . In particular, a country's welfare depends on its income (it is going to be more willing to contribute to abatement if it is richer), the total abatement (G) and the country's individual abatement (g i ). Though "warm glow" may not be the best term to describe it, casual empiricism suggests that countries do care about how much they individually are contributing to solving the problem. It is a real effect.
At the simplest level, Eqn. 3 suggests that if a warm glow effect exists, it has the net effect of reducing c. If in fact the net c becomes lower than b, then it becomes individually rational for the country to contribute to the public good. If, on the other hand, the effect is not that strong, Eqn (4b) suggests that the size of an IEA will actually decline in the presence of a warm glow effect (which is not what we would expect to occur in the real world).
What is attractive about introducing both income and warm glow into the standard model of an IEA is that all four anomalies articulated above may be addressed. Unilateral action (A1) may occur.
Income (A2) becomes important and, to draw parallels with the voluntary provision of public goods literature, higher income countries will contribute more. Free riding (A3) will be reduced. Whether cooperation and the size of an IEA will increase as the MPCR increases remains to be seen.
VI CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this paper is to identify ways to move the theory of international environmental agreements forward. A number of anomalies/discrepancies persist between theory and reality (reality being either casual empiricism about the "real world" or laboratory experiments).
The four empirically observed disconnects between reality and theory are (1) the tendency for countries to take unilateral action; (2) the fact that income plays a major role in treaty participation but not in theory; (3) free-riding plays a much more major role in theory than in experimental reality; and (4) cooperation seems to increase as the gain from cooperation increases, in contrast to theory.
The bulk of this paper reviews three relevant literatures: the theory of voluntary contributions to public goods; the theory of international environmental agreements (IEAs); and experimental literature on coalition formation, akin to the formation of an IEA.
In the spirit of Tom Schelling's contributions to the theory of cooperation over externalities, in would be desirable to at least move the theoretical finds on IEAs closer to the experimental results on coalitions and the voluntary provision of public goods. This may involve following in the footsteps of the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods literature, particularly with regard to "warm glow"
and other social preferences. Alternatively, more experimental tests may resolve the potential conflicts with theory. In any event, testing theory and further developing theory should go hand-in-hand in better understanding the problem that owes its genesis at least in part to Tom Schelling.
